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Abstract
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) were both born to stabilise vulnerable state borders by practising non-interference 
in domestic affairs. Today, the OAU’s successor, the African Union (AU), uses sanctions against 
unconstitutional changes of government, while ASEAN continues to rule out any collective 
punitive action against members. To explain these divergent trajectories, this article first shows 
how different traditions produced different ways of engaging with sanctions in the early formative 
cases of South Africa and Vietnam. Thereafter, it examines how these traditions were selectively 
re-thought when confronted with the dilemmas of international sanctions against Libya and 
Myanmar. The interpretive approach enables a nuanced account of continuity and change in beliefs 
about sanctions. The AU’s sanctions doctrine has updated rather than broken with a traditional 
interpretation of non-interference. For ASEAN, the longstanding tradition of informality – and 
not strict adherence to non-interference – has continued to rule out regional sanctions.
Keywords
African Union, ASEAN, comparative regionalism, non-interference, Organization of African 
Unity, sanctions
Regional cooperation in Africa and Southeast Asia began with a similar aim: to protect 
the sovereignty of vulnerable postcolonial states. Non-interference in domestic affairs 
became a pillar of the Organization of African Unity (OAU, formed May 1963) and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, formed August 1967). Over time, 
this tradition of a negatively defined regionalism has been re-thought in different ways 
in the two regions. The OAU’s successor, the African Union (AU, formed May 2001), 
has established a far-reaching sanctions policy against unconstitutional changes of 
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government in its member states. ASEAN, in contrast, has rejected any sanctions 
mechanism against members and has instead become known as an opponent to inter-
national sanctions.
This article interprets these different trajectories by analysing how their contrasting 
approach to the use of sanctions was built on legacies long predating the formal institu-
tionalisation or explicit rejection of punitive instruments against members. The OAU 
recognised the importance of sanctions for regional politics early on, as a sender and 
enthusiastic proponent of anti-apartheid sanctions. In Southeast Asia, the early experi-
ence of international sanctions against Vietnam was overshadowed by the Vietnam War, 
and ASEAN neither joined nor collectively opposed sanctions. To make its case, the 
article proceeds in three steps. First, it justifies the article’s focus on regionalism and 
sanctions, including some vital background material on the two organisations studied. 
Second, it investigates the formative early days of regional cooperation, when the OAU 
experienced sanctions in South Africa and ASEAN in Vietnam, these historical episodes 
giving rise to their respective webs of belief about the appropriate balance to be struck 
between sanctioning states on one hand and not meddling in the sovereign affairs of 
another state on the other. Finally, the article shows how these beliefs were selectively 
reinterpreted as African and Southeast Asian leaders confronted new dilemmas of inter-
national sanctions in Libya and Burma/Myanmar,1 respectively. Crucially, it is shown 
that the OAU’s rebellion against international sanctions against Libya in the late 1990s 
triggered the construction of the AU, demonstrating that regionalists in Africa have 
tended to be selective rather than unreserved advocates of sanctions. ASEAN’s disinter-
est in committing to a collective stance was perpetuated in its reaction to international 
sanctions against Myanmar, where the practice of ‘constructive engagement’ was vari-
ously interpreted by different members.
Interpreting sanctions
This article makes an interpretive contribution to three broader sets of the literature. 
First, given that regional approaches to sanctions are presented below as key examples 
of ‘locally meaningful action’, the account given can help correct the Western bias of 
some scholarship on foreign policy and international relations.2 Second, the analysis 
treats beliefs about sanctions within ASEAN and AU as cases of interest in their own 
right and thereby challenges the regionalism literature’s privileging of the European 
Union (EU) as a model for ‘proper regionalism’.3 Finally, it adds to the hitherto largely 
descriptive literature on the history of regional projects by considering the role of 
inherited traditions in explaining diverging political practices when confronted with 
similar dilemmas.4
The article works within the Special Issue’s wider research programme by analysing 
the case study material using the concepts of tradition and dilemma to explain policy 
practices undertaken by the ‘situated agents’ in each of the organisations (see the intro-
ductory article), which are assumed to be elite-driven projects that have only occasion-
ally reached out for popular support. Traditions are inherited beliefs and practices and 
dilemmas are the confrontation of existing beliefs and practices with new ideas, knowl-
edge, information or circumstances.5 Non-interference is the tradition that has left the 
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strongest imprint on regionalism in both Africa and Southeast Asia. However, this article 
shows that the meaning of this tradition for regional politics has differed, and as a result 
their practices have diverged. Non-interference has interacted with the traditions of Pan-
Africanism and racial equality in Africa, and the traditions of informality and anti- 
communism in Southeast Asia, to produce different webs of belief about the rightful 
scope of regional involvement in domestic affairs. Traditions internal to the organisa-
tions thus interacted in complex ways with dilemmas arising inside and outside the 
regions. Of particular note, the paradigmatic ‘novel circumstance’ of the end of the Cold 
War created new dilemmas for regional politics and changed the character of the per-
petual dilemma of interference by external powers.6
The article scrutinises two political crises that placed traditionally understood region-
alism at a crossroads: United Nations (UN) sanctions against Libya (1992–2003) and 
unilateral international sanctions against Myanmar (1990–2013).7 These situations posed 
genuine dilemmas to regional leaders’ traditional beliefs about the appropriate range and 
content of regional action towards constituent members. In response to these dilemmas, 
the OAU re-thought non-interference to produce a stability-friendly sanctions doctrine, 
whereas ASEAN stayed with less outspoken, non-binding ways of influencing its con-
stituency. Before the analysis itself, it is important to provide some essential background 
on the two organisations and their use of sanctions, so we have a baseline from which to 
compare the situations ‘before’ and ‘after’ the ‘sanctions dilemmas’ arose.
The AU is a regional organisation with 54 member states, incorporating all African 
countries except for Morocco.8 It was set up in May 2001 out of the ashes of the OAU, 
formed in 1963 by 37 independent countries, but increasingly delegitimised as a privi-
leged ‘dictators’ club’.9 By introducing the possibility of intervening in the affairs of 
member states through sanctions, the AU broke with the OAU’s negatively defined 
regionalism. ‘Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments’ 
is one of the AU’s working principles10 developed in the Lomé Declaration11 and in the 
African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance which entered into force on 
15 February 2012.12 The power to decide on sanctions ‘whenever an unconstitutional 
change of government takes place in a member state’ lies with the AU Peace and Security 
Council.13 As of December 2014, the AU’s ‘total rejection of unconstitutional changes of 
Government’,14 and ‘zero tolerance’ for coups d’etat,15 has produced 13 instances of 
sanctions against 11 members: Central African Republic (2003–2005; 2013 to the pre-
sent), Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005–2007; 2008–2009), Comoros (2007–2008) 
Guinea-Conakry (2008–2010), Niger (2009–2011), Madagascar (2009–2013), Côte 
d’Ivoire (2010–2011), Guinea-Bissau (2012–2014), Mali (2012) and Egypt (2013–2014). 
Concrete measures include suspension of membership rights as well as targeted sanc-
tions against individuals and entities which hinder the return to constitutional order.16
This article shows that the AU’s sanctions doctrine is not a rejection as such of the 
OAU’s traditional interpretation of non-interference. Early in its history, the OAU identi-
fied sanctions as a political game-breaker, when economic and political isolation was 
singled out as the way to deal with apartheid regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. Its 
anti-apartheid campaign was part of the continental liberation struggle, carried out in the 
name of the tradition of Pan-Africanism. Given the lack of legitimacy of apartheid 
regimes, sanctions were never thought to break with the tradition of non-interference. 
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With the birth of the AU, peace and security replaced liberation as the main goal of con-
tinental politics. The AU uses sanctions in this framework to promote regime stability 
and gradual democratisation.17 The delineated scope of AU sanctions does not intrude on 
the sovereignty of established regimes, but places states disrespecting the constitutional 
order outside of the protection of non-interference.
Having introduced the AU context, the article next provides background on ASEAN 
and its approach to sanctions in the region. Forged out of a common interest in contain-
ing the spread of communism in the region, ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore.18 The organisation had a defined inter-
nal ‘other’ – communism – yet explicitly aimed to eventually bring together ‘all States in 
the South-East Asian Region’.19 In 1999, Cambodia became the 10th member of the 
Association, leaving East Timor the only Southeast Asian country not yet part of 
ASEAN.20 In the 1990s, the ‘ASEAN way’ of informal regionalism was heralded as a 
model. However, the severe financial crisis of the late 1990s shook not only member 
states’ national economies but also the model’s reputation (much as with the EU today). 
The organisation was judged incapable of dealing with the crisis ‘without violating the 
ASEAN Way’.21
This capability–expectation gap posed a dilemma for traditional Southeast Asian 
regionalism and prompted calls for reform.22 A group of prominent political figures – 
‘The Eminent Persons Group’ – was entrusted to draft a Charter proposal.23 The group 
pointed out that ASEAN may need to calibrate their traditional approach of non- 
interference and proposed a sanctions provision enabling suspension of any of the rights 
and privileges of membership.24 The proposal was rejected.25 Despite a ‘new political 
commitment at the top level’, and the ambition to become a ‘Rules-based Community of 
Shared Values and Norms’, the Charter (2008) and the ASEAN Political and Security 
Blueprint (2009) excluded any sanctions provision.26 ASEAN thus seems unlikely to 
develop a formalised sanctions doctrine not because it rejects any type of interference in 
domestic affairs – it clearly does not – but because this particular type of interference 
does not fit with the authoritative self-representation of the ‘ASEAN way’.27 
Institutionalised punishment through sanctions requires a degree of formal and publicly 
expressed commitment that is alien to the type of regionalism embodied in ASEAN.
Shared starting points and the sanctions dilemma
Born only 4 years apart, at their respective ‘starting points’, cooperation in the OAU and 
ASEAN was conditioned by two sets of circumstances common to both.28 First, the OAU 
and ASEAN were projects marked by postcolonialism. Ever since the first colonisers 
arrived in the sixteenth century to Southeast Asia and in the eighteenth century to Africa, 
the regions were subject to political and economic exploitation by external actors. 
Thailand, Ethiopia and Liberia are the only countries in these regions that have not been 
colonised in this way.29 Having lived under the perpetual dilemma of external interfer-
ence, both organisations were formed out of opposition to Western oppression and in 
celebration of self-determination. At the inception of the OAU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s 
Emperor Haile Selassie declared, ‘Today, We name as our first great task the final liberat-
ing of those Africans still dominated by foreign exploitation and control’.30 The first 
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resolution of the first Summit in 1963 was devoted to decolonisation, in particular, against 
continued foreign domination and the political power of settlers. At the inception of 
ASEAN in Bangkok, Thai Foreign Minister Khoman similarly declared that the organisa-
tion was to ‘erase the old and obsolete concept of domination and subjection of the past’.31 
ASEAN’s foundational Bangkok Declaration of 1967 expressed the determination to 
‘ensure stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation’.32
A second shared feature is that both organisations rejected regional interference in 
domestic affairs. Regional cooperation in Africa was negatively defined, as a means to 
protect the integrity of the state.33 Since the young African states had difficulty in defend-
ing their borders with force, external sovereignty became ‘the counterpart of internal 
state weakness’.34 ASEAN came into being during a period of regional turbulence, char-
acterised by ‘territorial disputes; ethnic conflicts and animosities; religious prejudices 
and smaller states’ fear of larger states’.35 In recognition of these challenges, ASEAN 
members began ‘collaborating with each other to shore up rather than undermine their 
domestic orders’.36 As a consequence of the preoccupation with stable states, both the 
OAU and the ASEAN became known as dictators’ clubs. Violations of human rights and 
democracy were met with silence, and a culture of impunity was dubbed to reign in 
regional politics. To use sanctions against members was unthinkable.
However, both organisations were exposed to sanctions in their early years, leading to 
a situation in which the tradition of non-interference was interpreted in close interface 
with other emerging traditions. The OAU engaged with sanctions on several occasions 
and internalised them as an issue for the region. The experience of anti-apartheid sanc-
tions matched with the core traditions of early African regionalism: racial equality and 
Pan-Africanism. Interpreted in light of these traditions, non-interference did not apply to 
the clearly illegitimate apartheid regimes. ASEAN, in contrast, kept its distance from 
sanctions. It neither joined nor collectively opposed international sanctions against 
Vietnam, where the traditions of anti-communism and informality outplayed each other. 
Interpreted in light of these traditions, non-interference became a convenient justifica-
tion for the lack of collective action in ASEAN. The following two sections describe in 
more detail how the newly formed regional organisations reacted to sanctions against the 
non-members of South Africa and Vietnam, which clearly were part of the region, but 
outside the formal practices of regional cooperation.
In the case of South Africa, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie welcomed the dele-
gates to the first meeting of the OAU declaring, ‘[o]ur political and economic liberty 
will be devoid of meaning for so long as the degrading spectacle of South Africa’s 
apartheid continues to haunt our waking hours and to trouble our sleep’.37 The fight 
against apartheid in South Africa was the single most important issue for the OAU at the 
time of its formation and for three decades to come. African regionalism was always 
intended to have continental reach, but membership was explicitly made conditional on 
being an independent and sovereign state.38 South Africa, being under White minority 
rule, fell short of this requirement and was not a member of the OAU. As a consequence 
of the regime’s absolute lack of legitimacy, ‘the OAU never considered apartheid an 
issue of domestic jurisdiction’.39 Instead, the anti-apartheid campaign was central for 
building a ‘postcolonial Pan-African identity’, which emphasised self-determination 
and racial equality.40
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Sanctions were, indeed, the main policy incarnation of the struggle against apartheid. 
The inaugural conference of the OAU produced a ‘resolution on apartheid and Racial 
Discrimination’, and the very first Assembly meeting declared that ‘sanctions of every 
nature [are] the only means available of achieving a peaceful solution to the explosive 
situation which prevails in South Africa’.41 ‘Promotion of sanctions’ was thereafter a 
‘recurring theme’ of OAU resolutions.42 There were nuances in how apartheid was seen 
on the continent, but the organisation prioritised ‘preserving normative consensus’ on the 
issue.43 Questioning the utility of sanctions was largely taboo. The OAU’s normative 
consensus was crucial for the ‘international anti-apartheid sanctions movement’.44 The 
OAU successfully united in the ‘coalition politics’ of the UN,45 and the UN General 
Assembly referred to an OAU declaration when it recognised the South African libera-
tion movements, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC) as ‘the authentic representatives of the people of South Africa’ in 1973.46 In doing 
so, the Assembly – just like the OAU – ‘confirmed the principle of national sovereignty, 
however altering its subject in the specific case of South Africa’, thereby circumventing 
the regime’s claim that ‘any criticism of apartheid was an intervention in its “internal 
affairs”’.47 Sanctions were – rightly or wrongly – given much credit for the fall of apart-
heid and by extension for the reunification of the continent. The united struggle created 
a positive legacy for African agency through sanctions. This legacy could be activated in 
a formalised, allegedly ‘apolitical’, regional sanctions regime once the OAU had been 
transformed into the AU.
ASEAN was born ‘in the shadow of the Vietnam War’, yet never developed a com-
mon approach either to the US sanctions (1951–1994) or to the war itself (1965–1977).48 
Whereas Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia supported the South Vietnamese 
regime,49 the organisation avoided ‘any appearance of group involvement in what was 
taking place’.50 Considering that anti-communism had brought ASEAN founders 
together, the lack of a coordinated reaction to the developments in Vietnam is striking. 
However, the tradition of anti-communism proved a more complicated ideational basis 
for Southeast Asian regional cooperation than racial equality was for Africa. If anti-
apartheid was the continuation of the African liberation struggle, anti-communism was 
strongly linked to the perpetual dilemma of great power influence. ASEAN founders 
especially feared that Beijing and Moscow would spark communist insurgency in their 
own countries.51 They depended on the United States to manage this threat, but their 
attitude towards American involvement in regional affairs was ambivalent. The depend-
ency on the United States contrasted with the explicit – though in the Cold War context 
arguably idealistic – aim for nations to ‘take charge of their own future’ and to ‘minimise 
manipulation and domination by the great powers’.52 This goal received an ambitious 
packaging when ASEAN announced the creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971. ZOPFAN aimed to make Southeast Asia ‘free from any 
form or manner of interference by outside Powers’, but soon ‘assumed the quality of a 
political chameleon’, malleable to the interests of different states.53
After the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, cooperation in ASEAN intensified.54 The 
first summit of heads of government took place in 1976, and the central secretariat 
opened in Jakarta in the same year. Faced with a communist Indochina, ASEAN opted 
for constructive diplomacy rather than isolation.55 Once the United States had left 
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Vietnam, this was seen as the only realistic way to temper potentially expansionist 
leftist governments. ASEAN anti-communism stemmed from a fear of internal com-
munist insurgency and was not an ideological struggle to be pursued at any price. At 
the 1976 summit, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) was signed which 
sought to ‘appease these [communist] states and persuade them to join ASEAN in 
establishing a collaborative regional environment’.56 In consequence, the principle of 
regional freedom from external involvement was sidestepped by individual states 
whenever it was considered unavoidable or strategically beneficial. Nonetheless, for 
ASEAN to openly approve of external interference in Vietnam would have discred-
ited the rhetorical basis of the regional project. The organisation never came together 
either in opposition or in support of sanctions. Moreover, whereas anti-apartheid 
brought normative consensus to Africa, anti-communism epitomised a division cut-
ting through the region. Since ASEAN always aimed at region-wide cooperation, it 
downplayed the ‘social conflict’ between members and not-yet members.57
Interpreting divergence
This section shows that these practical interpretations of traditions remained important 
when the AU instituted its sanctions policy and ASEAN became a critic of international 
sanctions. The AU’s sanctions doctrine did not question the sovereignty of incumbent 
regimes, even if they had weak democratic credentials. By making political legitimacy 
solely conditional on constitutional order, coup-makers and rebels were placed outside of 
the protection of the principle of non-interference. ASEAN’s ‘constructive engagement’ 
with Myanmar always accommodated different national interpretations. The absence of 
a sanctions mechanism in Southeast Asian regional cooperation followed from an unwill-
ingness to bind member states to a regional position, rather than from a universal rejec-
tion of interference in domestic affairs. The two sanctions-related dilemmas discussed 
below are Libya for the OAU and Myanmar for ASEAN.
Turning first to the OAU, it is worth prefacing the discussion of sanctions with the 
observation that the transformation of African regionalism from the OAU to the AU took 
place against the background of paradigmatic developments in the world order (globali-
sation, the end of the Cold War) and in the region (almost completed decolonisation and 
genocide in Rwanda and Burundi). The international dispute over Libya’s involvement 
in the Lockerbie (1988) and Niger (1989) airplane bombings came against these wider 
systemic dilemmas which affected how the issue was interpreted by opinion formers in 
the OAU.58 On this issue of extraordinary symbolic weight, African leaders were torn 
between expressing loyalty to the UN system and solidarity with a fellow African coun-
try. Situated agents drew on the Pan-African tradition, and in particular on traditional 
beliefs about conditions for non-interference, in their handling of this dilemma.
Initially, African countries implemented UN sanctions against Libya (1992–2003) as 
members of the UN. However, in 1994 the OAU stated ‘its solidarity with the Great 
Jamahiriya’, and the following year sanctions were labelled ‘unjust’ and hurtful to the 
peoples of Libya and neighbouring states.59 Two years later, the OAU summit asked for 
‘these obnoxious sanctions’ to be lifted.60 The call to lift sanctions recurred in all follow-
ing OAU summits.61 In 1998, the OAU decided ‘on moral and religious grounds’ to 
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independently lift sanctions against Libya.62 According to Ben Kioko, head of the AU’s 
Legal Department, by leaving the international sanctions regime the OAU showed that it 
was ready to ‘push the frontiers of collective stability and security to the limit without 
any regard for legal niceties such as the authorization of the Security Council’.63
The OAU accepted Gaddafi’s counter-sanctions rhetoric, which did not oppose sanc-
tions in principle but appropriated liberal-internationalist norms advocated by the initia-
tors of sanctions.64 Thereby, the dilemma between international norms and neighbourly 
solidarity was settled from the OAU’s perspective. The Libyan position was internalised 
in the name of African solidarity. International norms were not openly disputed but rein-
terpreted. Gaddafi was constructed as a legitimate sovereign in the OAU’s understanding 
and should therefore be protected from the external interference of sanctions. The OAU 
did not dismiss sanctions in general, but argued that Libya had done nothing wrong. One 
of the last OAU summits declared that ‘any act aimed at destabilizing and undermining 
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes an affront to the collective aspiration of Africa 
and African peoples towards the attainment of self-esteem, dignity and independence’.65 
As we will see in the next section, ASEAN’s criticism of international sanctions against 
Myanmar was poles apart from this. The organisation acknowledged a problem in 
Myanmar but argued that constructive engagement was preferable to sanctions.
One year after leaving UN sanctions, African leaders ‘mercifully killed off’ the 
divided and weak OAU.66 In its place, the AU was born,67 and with it a new ‘philosophi-
cal bas[i]s for cooperation’.68 The importance of Muammar Gaddafi’s African vision 
received special attention when African leaders announced the decision to establish an 
AU.69 His ideational and financial investments were decisive for the project even taking 
off. The OAU’s collective criticism of sanctions had made him reorient from Pan-
Arabism to Pan-Africanism.70 Framed ‘in the discursive garments of Pan-Africanism’, a 
radically expanded regional mandate allowing for both sanctions and military interven-
tion gained wide support.71 However, the AU’s sanctions doctrine did not endorse sanc-
tions in general, but used the instrument selectively in favour of regime stability and 
gradual democratisation. Just as in the OAU, only legitimate sovereigns are protected by 
the principle of non-interference. The AU updated the Pan-African tradition of non-inter-
ference by expressly placing coup-makers, rebels or any other meddlers with constitu-
tional order outside of this group.
AU sanctions have therefore come to work from the assumption that members are 
attached to the organisation and recognise its authority. This truly Pan-African logic of 
attachment is extended to anyone with a claim to leadership of an African country. Not 
only existing governments but also their challengers are expected to care about the 
approval of other African states and fear exclusion from the group. The threat of sanc-
tions is a threat not only of material punishment but also of isolation.72 They do not want 
to ‘feel outside of the African society’.73 This view is shared by EU officials, who see 
AU sanctions as putting a country/leadership in the ‘sick-room’ and then ‘bring[ing] 
them back’: ‘it is a moral thing’ where ‘peer pressure’ is working.74 AU sanctions are 
‘norm setting on moral grounds’, for which the ‘concept of inclusion and dialogue’ is 
crucial.75 This emphasis on reconciliation fits with stability as the main purpose of the 
AU’s sanctions policy. Sanctions are the responsibility of the AU’s Peace and Security 
Council and are supposed to be imposed automatically, without sensibility to political 
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context. In accordance with the tradition of non-interference, they should not be used to 
influence legitimate sovereigns, but to shield them from illegitimate upheavals. Some 
African leaders that the sanctions doctrine protects have themselves come to power 
through coups, and yet others have remained in power for years without facing proper 
electoral scrutiny.
We turn secondly to ASEAN and the dilemma of sanctions against Myanmar. 
Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN posed a genuine dilemma for existing members, mak-
ing up ‘the most serious challenge to ASEAN’s international standing since the Cold 
War’.76 In this dilemma, the importance of good relations with Western powers was set 
against ASEAN’s vision of uniting the region in solidarity and flexible cooperation 
among friends. The United States and the EU lobbied against accession and severed their 
sanctions regimes.77 However, ASEAN refused to bend and in 1997 Myanmar became a 
member ‘in outright defiance of Western powers’.78 In the short term, ASEAN’s diplo-
matic relations to the United States and the EU suffered.79 Then again, its membership 
gave external actors the possibility of holding ASEAN responsible for the developments 
in the country. The dilemma of having a hard-necked military junta in the friendship 
circle made core situated agents (headed by Thai foreign minister and later ASEAN 
Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan) selectively reconsider the traditional hands-off 
approach to domestic affairs that had long been ASEAN’s official line of business.
If sanctions against Libya were dismissed as unfair by the African community, 
ASEAN acknowledged a problem in Myanmar.80 It repeatedly criticised international 
sanctions, arguing that constructive engagement81 would have a better chance at bringing 
about positive change than sanctions.82 ‘Constructive engagement’ was often seen as ‘a 
particular kind of interference in support of the regime’,83 but actually alternated between 
encouragement and open criticism.84 An Indonesian diplomat described the way that 
ASEAN approached Myanmar: ‘we are telling them very quietly, in a Southeast Asian 
way, without any fanfare, without any public statements: “Look, you are in trouble, let us 
help you. But you have to change, you cannot continue like this”’.85 ASEAN tried to 
convince Myanmar that it would be better off ‘regionalising’ than ‘internationalising’ its 
internal issues.86
Constructive engagement was negatively defined as something other than sanctions: 
‘[t]o avoid disrupting lucrative trade and investment links necessitated a moderate, non-
coercive approach to promoting political reform’.87 Beyond that, the contents of the 
alternative to sanctions were interpreted in different ways by the ASEAN members.88 
There was no collective stance: ‘each country can do what it wants, say what it wants as 
it sees fit’.89 In consequence, sanctions against Burma were never internalised as a con-
cern for ASEAN itself. In all joint communiqués from 44 years of ASEAN Ministerial 
Meetings, sanctions against Myanmar have been mentioned just once, in a statement 
which simply restated the country’s own position.90 This contrasts with the OAU’s 
repeated resolutions concerning Libya, where sanctions were seen as an offence against 
the whole of Africa.
Sanctions have been consistently ruled out by ASEAN not because Southeast Asian 
countries are extraordinarily loyal adherents to the tradition of non-interference but 
because sanctions conflicted with the prior tradition of informality. Sanctions have been 
seen within ASEAN as blunt and loud political instruments: they are always public and 
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seek maximum visibility. This goes against ASEAN’s traditional ‘behind-the-scenes-
approach’,91 or rejection of ‘public shouting’ in favour of ‘civility’, ‘discretion and cour-
tesy’, as put by Surin Pitsuwan (then Thai Foreign Minister) in 1998.92 Moreover, 
sanctions imply commitment. Sanctions bind senders to a political position and restrict 
their room for manoeuvre. This is an unrealistic strait-jacket for an organisation that 
since its foundation takes pride in offering an umbrella big enough to accommodate dif-
ferent national positions. It is hard to imagine a dilemma which would make ASEAN 
give up this pillar in its self-representation anytime soon. From ASEAN’s point of view, 
Myanmar’s partial liberalisation in 2011–2012 resolved the dilemma in a way which 
confirmed its rejection of sanctions. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak trium-
phantly declared that ‘[t]he Asean Way Won Burma Over’. According to Razak, ‘Our 
encouragement did more to create political change than Western sanctions and scold-
ings’.93 Most international sanctions were lifted by 2013.94 Whereas proponents of sanc-
tions see reforms in Myanmar as evidence of sanctions success, Isabellla Bennett and 
Julie Ginsberg argue that ASEAN’s non-punitive approach ‘gained more credibility’.95
Conclusion
This article has traced the difference in attitudes to sanctions between the OAU/AU and 
ASEAN back to their interpretations of core traditions at the early stage of cooperation 
in their respective regions. Protecting states from meddling in domestic affairs, whether 
from external powers or from the region itself, was an imperative motivation for both 
OAU and ASEAN. However, non-interference interacted with other traditions to pro-
duce diverging interpretations of the appropriate scope and content of regional action. 
For the OAU, non-interference did not apply to the illegitimate apartheid regimes. For 
ASEAN, non-interference was used to justify the reluctance of members to pull behind 
collective action in Vietnam. Although crucial dilemmas – in this article exemplified by 
Libya and Myanmar – have pushed both regions to selectively re-think these beliefs, the 
core interpretation of non-interference remains relevant. The AU sanctions doctrine sig-
nals that one cannot become a legitimate sovereign through unconstitutional means, and 
ASEAN members still cherish the dealing with regional crises nationally.
The trajectories of the OAU/AU and ASEAN highlight that non-interference is not a 
static or dichotomous concept, but a living tradition that is continuously reinterpreted by 
political actors. Both the AU’s alleged turn away from non-interference and the ASEAN’s 
continued loyalty to it are exaggerated. The AU did not ‘abandon state sovereignty’, as 
the BBC reported at the time of its inauguration,96 but re-thought it to fit the purposes of 
stability and international recognition. Likewise, non-interference is not a sanctified con-
stant in Southeast Asian regionalism, but a contested rhetorical device malleable to the 
interpretations of individual states.
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